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JURY REFORM AT THE END OF THE CENTURY:
REAL AGREEMENT, REAL CHANGES
Phoebe C. Ellsworth*
INTRODUCTION
Complaints about the jury system and calls for its reform are
nothing new-they have probably existed as long as the jury system
itself. Warren Burger called for the reform of the civil jury in
1971'; in 1905 William Howard Taft decried the contemporary
tendency "to exalt the jury's power beyond anything which is wise
or prudent .... ,2 Judges complain to judges, lawyers complain to
lawyers, legal academics write articles about the jury for other legal
academics, social scientists report their research on juries to other
social scientists, and the jurors themselves go home and express
their exasperation to their families. Any of them may try to tell
their stories to the public, and journalists fan the flames of discon-
tent.
The University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform Symposium,
'Jury Reform: Making Juries Work," was unusual and particularly
valuable in that it brought together these disparate students and
critics-judges, lawyers, legal academics, social scientists, and even
an experienced and thoughtful juror-to share their knowledge
and concerns, thus managing to achieve that diversity of perspec-
tives that many believe is one of the major advantages of the jury
itself.
A second unusual and valuable feature of the Symposium was a
shift in emphasis from a concern with documenting, analyzing,
and bewailing the failures of the American jury to a concern with
devising, implementing, and testing solutions. More remarkable
yet, there was a heartening convergence in the views of partici-
pants whose intellectual backgrounds and practical experience
were very different. Although there was some disagreement about
the particular nature of the problems in the jury system and their
* Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law and Roberts B. Zajonc Collegiate Professor of
Psychology, University of Michigan. A.B. 1966, Harvard University; Ph.D. 1970, Stanford
University. I wish to express my gratitude to Michael Sachs for organizing the Journal of Law
Reform's Symposium on Jury Reform and inviting me to participate in it.
1. See generally Warren A. Berger, The State of the Federal Judiciary-I 971, 57 ABAJ. 855
(1971).
2. William H. Taft, The Administration of CriminalLaw, 15 YALE LJ. 1, 14 (1905).
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seriousness, similar suggestions for reform were proposed by
judges, lawyers, scholars, and jurors. And many of the reforms
were not merely empty wishes; the Symposium also included pre-
liminary reports of attempts to implement these suggestions.
I. THE RECENT RISE IN INTEREST INJURY REFORM
Before 1970, social science exploration of the jury consisted of a
scattering of small isolated studies and one monumental research
initiative which culminated in 1966 with the publication of Kalven
and Zeisel's The American Jury.3 This study recruited more than 500
judges who reported on jury verdicts in more than 3500 trials from
all regions of the United States. The authors found that the jury
verdicts matched the verdicts the judge would have given 78% of
the time (both for civil and criminal cases) and, in a ringing en-
dorsement of the American jury system, concluded that there was
no substantial evidence that juries were incompetent to perform
their task . In 1968, in the case of Duncan v. Louisiana,5 the Su-
preme Court extended to the States the right to jury trial in
criminal cases.6 This decision paved the way for a series of deci-
sions about what the right to a jury trial actually implied, including
decisions regarding which common characteristics of juries-
representativeness, unanimity, twelve members-were essential to
the definition of ajury, and which were not.
Although there was hardly any research on jury decision making
at the time, and none that addressed the particular questions
raised in the cases before the court, the Supreme Court based its
decisions in part on empirical assumptions about the relation of
these characteristics to the quality of the jury's decision making.
For example, in Williams v. Florida,7 the first of these cases, the
Court considered the issue of the constitutionality of reducing the
number of jurors from twelve to six. In deciding that six-member
juries were constitutional, the Court made the empirical claim that
"the reliability of the jury as a factfinder hardly seems likely to be a
function of its size." 8
3. See generally HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICANJURY (1966).
4. See id.
5. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
6. See id. at 157-58.
7. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
8. Id. at 100-01.
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Social scientists were appalled that the Court could draw such
far-reaching conclusions about jury behavior without any evidence
whatsoever, and thus the Duncan decision and its progeny also
ushered in a period of intense activity by social scientists who felt
that the Court's empirical claims should be tested empirically. Re-
search on juries, initially inspired by dissatisfaction with the
Court's decisions on jury size and unanimity, 9 took on a life of its
own and became a flourishing field, slowly building up a body of
reliable knowledge about how juries function, what they do well
and what they do badly, how they respond to evidence and to ex-
tra-evidentiary information, and how certain procedural variations
impair or enhance their ability to perform their task.1° From
Kalven and Zeisel's original research" to the present, most social
scientists have agreed that juries are competent fact-finders, and
that jury deliberations tend to identify and correct errors offact and
to result in an understanding of the facts that is more complete and
more accurate than that of any individual member.'2 Whether this
competence extends to very complex technical evidence is still an
open question.
Over the same period of time, study after study found that jurors
are far less competent at understanding the law as presented to them
in the judges' instructions, and that the deliberation process is not
particularly effective in correcting legal mistakes or producing an
accurate understanding of the law. 3 Jurors' understanding of the
law can be considerably improved, however, by rewriting the tur-
gid, technical pattern instructions in clearer language" and by
providing the jurors with at least some instructions before the very
end of the trial.' 5
9. See generally Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972); Apodaca, Cooper, & Mad-
den v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
10. See generally VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THEJURY (1986).
11. See generally KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 3.
12. See REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 230 (1983); Vicki L. Smith, How Jurors
Make Decisions: The Value of Trial Innovations, inJuRY TRIAL INNOVATIONS (G. Thomas Mun-
sterman et al. eds., 1997);Joel D. Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us
About the Juy Instruction Process, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL., & L. 589 (1997); see also HANS &
VIDMAR, supra note 10, at 118-20.
13. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 10, at 120--27; HASTIE ET AL., supra note 12, at 231;
see also Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One, 52 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
205, 218-23 (1989). For an excellent review of these studies, see generally Lieberman &
Sales, supra note 12.
14. See generally Shari Seidman Diamond &Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death
By Revising and Testing Juty Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224 (1996); Amiram Elwork et al.,
Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or In Light of It, 1 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 163 (1977).
15. See generally Vicki L. Smith, Impact of Pretrial Instruction onJurors'Information Process-
ing and Decision Making, 76J. APP. PSYCHOL. 220 (1991).
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Social scientists have made numerous suggestions for reform, be-
ginning in the mid-1970's and continuing up to the present."6 Until
very recently, however, these suggestions were largely ignored. In
1991, Alexander Tanford reviewed the impact of two of the most
commonly proposed reforms-preinstructing the jury on substan-
tive law and giving jurors written copies of the instructions to use
during their deliberations-on state courts, legislatures, and rule-
making commissions. Tanford found no evidence whatsoever for a
trend towards greater use of these procedures.1 7 He concluded that
lawmakers were unlikely to be persuaded of a need for reform on
the basis of social science research. It appears not that the calls of
the social scientists were considered and rejected, but rather that
they were simply ignored.
Intense media coverage of a series of dramatic trials has accom-
plished what decades of social science research, high on
responsibility but low on human interest, could not. In this Sympo-
sium issue, Professor Marder argues,"' as do Hans, Hannaford, and
Munsterman, 9 that public concern about juries and their short-
comings has been galvanized by a string of high publicity cases: the
Menendez brothers, Lorena Bobbitt, Rodney King, OJ. Simpson,
and a host of minor characters in the Simpson drama became
names that evoked instant recognition and often considerable pas-
sion in many if not most Americans. The public became disturbed
and often outraged about the failure of the jury system, and, as
Marder documents,0 calls for reform became increasingly com-
mon and increasingly urgent.
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the public and
the media, once awakened to the need for reform, called for con-
sideration of the social science research that had been
accumulating quietly over the years. The public's view of the prob-
lems within the jury system was not the same as the social scientists'
view, and the reforms they called for bore little resemblance to the
recommendations of the social scientists.
16. See generally Lieberman & Sales, supra note 12.
17. See generallyJ. Alexander Tanford, Law Reforms By Courts, Legislatures, and Commis-
sions Following Empirical Research on jury Instructions, 25 L. & Soc. REv. 155 (1991).
18. See Nancy S. Marder, The Interplay of Race and False Claims ofJury Nullification, 32 U.
MICH.J.L. REFORM 285 (1999).
19 See Valerie P. Hans et al., The Arizona Juiy Reform Permitting Civil Jury Trial Discussions:
The Views of Trial Participants, Judges, and Jurors, 32 U. MICH.J.L. REFORM 349 (1999).
20. Marder, supra note 18.
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II. WHAT IS THE PROBLEM? Two PERSPECTIVES
ON THEJURY SYSTEM
In America today, public outrage is most reliably aroused by
people getting better than they deserve-sometimes literally
"getting away with murder," sometimes "getting something for
nothing." Juries are reviled as incompetent or biased when they
acquit "obviously guilty" defendants or when they award astro-
nomical damages for "obviously trivial" injuries.2 Although the
development of DNA analysis exonerated over 50 people who had
been wrongfully convicted (and who were lucky enough that test-
able material from the crime still existed), and although over the
last 20 years more than 75 people have been released from death
row due to serious doubts about their guilt, these stories do not
seem to provoke the same crusading passion as decisions that are
regarded as too lenient.22 The juries that wrongfully convicted
them are not singled out for the sort of scrutiny and criticism that
were leveled at the juries in the cases of the Menendez brothers,
Stacey Koon and his associates, and O.J. Simpson. Likewise, cases
in which civil plaintiffs receive no damages at all do not seem to
provoke much indignation.
A. CivilJuries
On the civil side, the public is aware of a "litigation explosion"
in which irresponsible or unscrupulous people either exaggerate
the seriousness of their injuries or try to pin the blame on some-
body (preferably somebody rich), in an attempt to acquire as
much money as possible. Lawsuits proliferate, and more and more
often these undeserving people are winning huge awards from gul-
lible juries. That, at least, is a common public perception of the
problem.
Before analyzing the causes of a problem and proposing solu-
tions, it is always important to step back and ask whether there
really is a problem at all. In this Symposium issue, Chappelear ar-
21. See generally Phoebe C. Ellsworth & A. Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Pol-
icy: Perceived Problems and Proposed Solutions, PSYCHOL., PUB. POL., & L. (forthcoming 1999)
(on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
22. See generally Samuel R. Gross, Lost Lives: Miscarriages ofJustice in Capital Cases, L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 1999) (addressing in depth the problem of erroneous con-
victions in capital cases) (on file with University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
WIN-MR 1999]
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gues cogently that the media have exaggerated the scope of the
jury problem, if there is one, by focusing on unusual cases with
fabulous awards. 3 He approaches the question more systematically,
examining every case to be tried in a-single Ohio courthouse over
a twelve-year period.24 The results of this careful scrutiny mesh
nicely with what other researchers, using different methods, have
found: most cases settle, most trials take less than a week, and most
damage awards are modest.25 Plaintiffs do not seem to be winning
more often now than they used to. Punitive damages are very rare.
On the whole, there is little evidence of a new and pressing need
for sweeping reforms.
On the other hand, the fact that some media stories have led to
exaggerated perceptions of the severity of the problem should not
be taken as evidence that there is no problem at all. The fact that
the decisions of civil juries are not recklessly fanatic should not
reassure us that they are perfect, that there is no room for im-
provement. Professor Hastie's article, in this issue, suggests for
example, that when setting punitive damages, most jurors consider
some of the criteria that are laid out in the judge's instructions,
but very few consider all of them. 6
Research on civil juries began somewhat more recently than re-
search on criminal juries, and much more needs to be done before
we will be in a position to make confident statements about the
steps in the decision making process that jurors handle effectively
and those that cause them difficulties, or to propose promising
remedies in the areas where civil juries seem to have most trouble.
Complex technical and statistical evidence, long multi-party trials,
the influence of damage severity on judgments of liability, and the
setting of compensatory and punitive damages have all been sug-
gested as areas of possible difficulty for juries.7 There is some
evidence to support these suggestions, but so far it is far from con-
clusive. For example, there is hardly any research that actually
compares judges' and juries' responses to the same trial materials;
23. See Stephen E. Chappelear, Jury Trials in the Heartland, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
241 (1999).
24. See id.
25. See generally Samuel R. Gross & Kent Syverud, Don't Ty: CivilJury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1996); Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What
Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking by Civil juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE
CIVILJURY SYSTEM. (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Special Issue, The Future of Punitive Damages,
1998 Wis. L. REv. 1;
26. See Reid Hastie, The Role of "Stories" in Civil Juy Judgments, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
227 (1999).
27. See generally Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation
of its Meaning and its Effects, 18 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 29 (1994); MacCoun, supra note 25.
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thus we do not know which of the jury's shortcomings are also
characteristic ofjudges. Ifjuries are susceptible to errors of reason-
ing on some aspects of their task, and judges are not, the focus of
reform efforts should be specifically aimed at the jury; but ifjudges
are susceptible to the same errors as jurors, obviously a different
kind of reform is needed.
B. Criminal Juries: Unreasonable
Acquittals and "Nullifications"
On the criminal side, the concern is with the perceived leniency
of juries, especially with their failure to convict "obviously guilty"
defendants. Sometimes this leniency is seen as gullibility. In the
first trial of Lyle Menendez, the jury was hung, with the six men
favoring a verdict of murder, and the six women a verdict of man-
slaughter. The women were portrayed by the media as emotional
creatures, moved to sympathy by irrelevant evidence.2" More re-
cently, as Marder persuasively argues in this Symposium issue,
active bias has replaced gullibility as the key element in media and
popular explanations of jury leniency: the issue is defined as one
ofjury nullification. 9
As Marder argues, most of what is labeled "nullification" is not
really nullification at all.30 True nullification occurs when the ju-
rors understand the law they are supposed to follow, and
consciously decide to disregard it. Sometimes they make this deci-
sion because they feel that the law itself is unjust; sometimes
because they feel that the punishment is unjust; and sometimes
because they feel that although the law and the punishment are
appropriate for the general case, strict adherence to the law would
be a miscarriage of justice in the particular case before them.31
This is the nullification of the juries who refused to enforce the
Fugitive Slave law, and it is the nullification of white juries who re-
fused to convict whites of crimes against blacks because they
believed that blacks were not fully human; for good or ill, it is an
intentional, and often principled decision.
28. Apparently the male jurors shared this view. See HAZEL THORNTON, HUNG JURY:
THE DIARY OF A MENENDEZJUROR 91 (1995).
29. See Marder, supra note 18.
30. See id.
31. See generally THOMAS ANDREW GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PER-
SPECTIVES ON THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIALJURY, 1200-1800 (1985).
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Current outcries against jury nullification define the term more
loosely, if they define it at all. They attribute to the jurors what
Green calls a "dishonest partisanship"-favoring one's own group
without careful consideration of the law at all 2 Sometimes it is
seen as embodying the morality of a stubborn and insular subcul-
ture (usually a minority subculture, nowadays, but sometimes, as in
the Rodney King case, the white racist subculture), and sometimes
it is the idiosyncratic bias of an individual holdout. It is further de-
scribed as an emotional resistance to the outcome that would be
inevitable under rational analysis. Principled nullification has of-
ten been viewed as a sign that the system is working well, that
"natural law" prevails over black-letter law, that juries reflect com-
munity standards of justice when the law itself does not. The
nullification decried by the media and the public, however, is
viewed as a sign that the system is falling apart, that self-interest
and bias prevail over any law.
As with the "litigation crisis," before we rush in with reforms de-
signed to deal with the "nullification crisis," we should first explore
whether there is a problem of crisis proportions, and what the na-
ture of the problem is. The bizarre cases of O.J. Simpson and Stacy
Koon and his colleagues can hardly be taken as evidence for a
general trend, and in fact there is little evidence that jury acquittals
are rising dramatically. 3  Vidmar and his colleagues examined rates
of conviction in the Federal Courts and five state courts (LA, FL,
NC, NY and TX) over periods ranging from ten to fifty years and
found that conviction rates have been stable over the last ten years
in state courts' while conviction rates have actually increased in Fed-
eral Courts over both the last ten years and the last fifty years. 4 The
scare stories about the rising tide of nullification usually rely on a
handful of apparently egregious cases. Sometimes these stories are
supplemented by the statements of a couple of individual prosecu-
tors or judges who assert that there is a nullification problem;
occasionally, a highly selective set of statistics is presented as
though they were representative." In an excellent expos6, Parlofft 6
demonstrated that all of this so-called statistical evidence could be
traced to a single Wall Street Journal article published the day after
32. See id. at 28.
33. See Roger Parloff, Race and Juries: If It Ain't Broke, AM. L., June, 1997, at 5-7, 72-74.
34. See generally Neil Vidmar et al., Should We Rush to Reform the Criminal Juy, 80 JUDI-
CATURE 286 (1997).
35. See Michael Meyers, The Racial Divide: Color-Blinded Juries, in RACE AND THE CRIMI-
NAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 41-45 (G. A. Reynolds ed., 1996); see generally Abigail Thernstorm &
Henry D. Fetter, From Scottsboro to Simpson, 122 PuB. INTEREST 17 (1996).
36. See Parloff, supra note 33.
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the OJ. Simpson verdict.37 For this and other reasons, Parloff sug-
gested that the evidence for the "nullification crisis" is largely
propaganda.
Like critics of the jury in every era, writers who are alarmed by
these twin crises tend to ascribe the weaknesses of the jury system
to the irrationality or prejudice of the people chosen for jury duty:
too many unsuitable people are allowed on juries; too many well-
qualified people are excused. At the beginning of the century Wil-
liam Howard Taft railed against a system that made it possible,
even perhaps inevitable, "to eliminate from all panels every man of
force and character and standing in the community, and to assem-
ble a collection in the jury box of nondescripts of no character,
weak and amenable to every breeze of emotion, however maudlin
or irrelevant to the issue. 38 At the end of the century, in an exhibi-
tion staged by a judge and a law professor, the idea that the
problem with the jury system is the undesirable influence of bad
jurors was reiterated by Judge James Rant, who bewailed the sub-
versive influence of "the obstinate loner, the obsessive individual,
the morally-challenged individual."
3 9
Who are these obstinate, morally-challenged nondescripts who
Taft and Rant rail about and who an abundance of commentators
on the OJ. Simpson case have in mind?40 Well, they are not mid-
dle-class white people. After the Simpson case, people felt more
free to say what they did not quite want to say before: that Black
jurors are reluctant to convict Blacks, so they nullif. 41 The nullifi-
cation crisis, and the litigation crisis too, are partly about race.
Current publications emphasize Black bias, not white bias, al-
though there is no evidence that one race is more scrupulous in
following the law in interracial cases than the other.
As Cohn and Sherwood point out, Black jurors are underrepre-
sented in jury pools, particularly in jurisdictions where most
defendants are Black. There is no public outcry about this unfair-
ness that approaches the outcry against nullification and juror
37. See Benjamin A. Holden et al., Color-blinded? Race Seems to Play an Increasing Role in
Many Jury Verdicts, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1995, at Al.
38. Taft, supra note 2, at 13.
39. Eugene R. Sullivan & Akhil R. Amar, Jury Reform in America: A Return to the Old
Country, 33 AM. CRIM. L. Rav. 1141, 1154 (1996) (quoting debate speech given by Rant).
40. See Marder, supra note 18.
41. See generally Thernstrom & Fetter, supra note 35; Michael D. Weiss & Karl Zinsmeis-
ter, When Race Trumps Truth in the Courtroom, 7 AM. ENTERPRISE 54 (1996); D. Levine, Race
Over Reason in the Jury Box, 148 READER'S DIGEST 385 (1996); Jeffrey Rosen, One Angry
Woman, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 24, 1997, 1997, at 54.
42. See Avern Cohn & David R. Sherwood, The Rise and Fall of Affirmative Action in Jury
Selection, 32 U. MICH.J.L. REFoitm 323 (1999).
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incompetence; for many people, I suspect, the underrepresentation
of Blacks is seen as one more sign of their unfitness. If they cannot
be recruited proportionally from voter registration lists, if they do
not settle down at one address and stay there, if they do not ea-
gerly respond to a summons from the Courthouse, they probably
are not people "of force and character and standing in the com-
munity" anyway. 43 So Cohn and Sherwood's efforts to achieve
representativeness by oversampling Blacks failed." Perhaps in the
future their efforts will succeed-if they sweeten the pill by refer-
ring to "neighborhood" rather than "race," or if they emphasize
the virtues of the new system they propose, which does not
"subtract" but merely "recycles" the white jurors. Race is not the
whore story behind the alarmist attacks on bad jurors, but it is cer-
tainly a part of it.
But, as with the "litigation crisis", the fact that there is no nullifi-
cation epidemic does not mean that there is no problem. An
honest mistake is still a mistake, and erroneous verdicts are a cause
for concern even if they have nothing to do with nullification. 5
Social science research provides ample evidence that the greatest
weakness of juries is their lack of understanding of the law.4 6 Most
surprising jury decisions are not the result of a careful analysis of
the law and a principled--or even an unprincipled-decision to
ignore it, but of an inability to figure out what the instructions
mean in the first place. Jurors work hard to understand the in-
structions, spending 20 percent or more of their deliberations
discussing the law,47 feel frustrated, and sometimes ask for help but
rarely get it. They finally muddle through with what seems like a
plausible interpretation, an interpretation that is often incorrect.
This is a cause for concern.
The research, however, provides no support for the public's
perception that this failure is due to the inclusion of jurors who
are biased or unfit. For decades, social scientists have tried to find
characteristics of individual jurors that would predict their verdicts
and their behavior in the jury room, and they have generally come
up empty-handed." Race, gender, income, education, occupation,
and personality have all been examined and have all turned out to
be practically useless in predicting how a person will behave when
43. Taft, supra note 2, at 13.
44. See Cohn & Sherwood, supra note 42.
45. See Marder, supra note 18.
46. See Ellsworth, supra note 13; HASTIE ET AL., supra note 13; see gneraly Elwork et al.,
supra note 14; Lieberman & Sales, supra note 12; Smith, supra note 12.
47. See Ellsworth, supra note 13, at 218; HASTIE ET AL., SUpra note 13, at 85.
48. See HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 10, at 131-48.
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called as a juror in a particular case. There is little support for the
popular notion that bad jury decisions are caused by bad jurors.
Social scientists therefore reject the "Bad Juror" theory as a gen-
eral explanation for questionable verdicts, and prefer a "Bad
System" theory, arguing that the decision making task is presented
to the jury in ways that make it unnecessarily difficult to reach a
well-informed, accurate decision. Some critics have argued that the
experience of jurors in the courtroom is structured to frustrate
understanding at every step. 9 The legal jargon of pattern instruc-
tions is obscure and unfamiliar; instructions are often
communicated to the jurors solely by being read out loud by the
judge; the legal framework that should help the jurors to organize
the evidence appropriately is withheld from them until after they
have already heard all the evidence; the evidence itself is presented
in a disorganized fashion; jurors are treated like blank slates, with
no preconceptions about the law; they are given little encourage-
ment to ask questions when they are uncertain about their task or
the law; and in general, they are reduced to passive non-
participants throughout the trial. None of these features of the
jury's task is conducive to high-quality decision making. Before de-
ciding thatjurors are governed by their hearts, we should consider
the possibility that the system does very little to encourage the in-
telligent use of their minds.
III. REFORMS
One of the most exciting revelations of the Symposium, re-
flected in several of the articles in this issue, was the astonishing
agreement among lawyers, social scientists, judges, and jurors
about how to improve the jury system. None of the members of
these constituencies subscribed to the "bad juror" theory of jury
incompetence or recommended solutions geared towards weeding
out inadequate jurors in favor of their better-endowed peers.
Rather, they all shared the view, long advocated by social scientists,
that the deficiencies in the performance of jurors reflect deficien-
cies in the system, and that reform efforts should involve changes
in the task presented to jurors rather than changes in the people
chosen to serve. Judge Dann of Arizona 5' and Judge Mize of the
49. See generally B. Michael Dann, "Learning Lessons" and "Speaking Rights": Creating
Educated and DemocraticJuries, 68 IND. L.J. 1229 (1993).
50. See id.
WINTER 1999]
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Washington D.C. Council for Court Excellence5 described the
comprehensive reforms they have initiated. Judge Dann, in his
1993 article and at the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Symposium, ridiculed the defects of the traditional legal model,
which treats jurors as passive observers without preexisting ideas or
frames of reference, recording a one-way stream of information
like tape-recorders, and waiting until all the evidence is in and the
legal categories have finally been revealed before reaching a
judgment. He contrasted this model with the "behavioral-
educational" model. According to this model, jurors approach the
evidence and law with their own frames of reference, which they
use to actively organize and evaluate the information they receive,
and reforms should take advantage of these cognitive strategies by
encouraging active involvement and providing jurors with more
tools to help them accomplish their task. In contrast, the passivity
of their role in the current system frustrates jurors; the instructions
baffle them. The whole process creates obstacles to attention, un-
derstanding, and accurate application of the law.
As illustrated by the contributions of Longhofer
52 and Phillips5 3
to this volume, many of the proposed reforms are designed to
transform jurors from passive sponges to active participants: allow-
ing them to take notes and to ask questions, and providing them
with the information they need, when they need it, to make the right
decision. The goals are to increase attention and a sense of con-
tinuous engagement, and to reduce confusion. 4 They range from
relatively uncontroversial suggestions, such as providing jurors
with written copies of the instructions, to more radical reforms,
such as allowing jurors to question witnesses or to discuss the case
among themselves before the trial is over.
Many of these reforms were proposed by social scientists, and
some of these proposals have been around for 20 years.55 They
went largely unnoticed, however, until the high-publicity trials of
the late 1980's and 1990's focused public and media attention on
the jury. Despite the immediate calls for reforms based on the "bad
juror" model, including provisions for nonunaminous juries in
criminal cases, the consensus opinion among judges, jurors, social
51. See generally COUNCIL FOR COURT EXCELLENCE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA JURY PROJ-
ECT, JURIES FOR THE YEAR 2000 AND BEYOND: PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEMS IN
WASHINGTON, D.C. (1998).
52. See Ronald S. Longhofer, Jury Trial Techniques in Complex Civil Litigation, 32 U.
MICH.J.L. REFORM 335 (1999).
53. See Annie King Phillips, Creating A Seamless Transition From Jury Box To Jury Room:
Proposals For More Effective Decision Making, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 279 (1999).
54. SeeEllsworth & Reifman, supra note 21.
55. See, e.g., Elwork et al., supra note 14.
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scientists, and to some extent attorneys, is solidly in favor of re-
forming the system and achieving collaboration among all four
groups in designing and evaluating reforms.
Perhaps most remarkable of all, several proposals for reform in-
clude provisions for empirical research designed to evaluate the
consequences of the reforms. For example, one of Annie King
Philips' suggestions is that jurors be allowed to discuss the case
with each other before the trial is over. 6 This innovation is being
tried in Arizona, and the Arizona Supreme Court has authorized a
random-assignment experiment to test its effects. In this issue, Pro-
fessor Hans and her colleagues report the first preliminary results
of that experiment.57 Among all the proposed innovations, the im-
portance of this commitment to well-designed empirical research
to discover the consequences of these changes should not be un-
derestimated. It is an exciting time for juries, with an explosion of
interest, a lively collaboration of scholars and practitioners, com-
prehensive proposals for change, actual implementation of some
of these proposals, and high-quality scientific study of their effects.
56. See Phillips, supra note 53.
57. SeeHans et al., supra note 19.
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